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Sobre los efectos benéficos en las adquisiciones empresariales 
con productos diferenciados
Abstract
We use a non-spatial (Chamberlinian) product differentiation model to analyze the welfare effects of horizontal mergers 
with quantity competition. We argue that (i) mergers can be welfare enhancing if the degree of product differentiation 
increases after the merger; and, (ii) privately profitable mergers can also increase welfare. Consequently, in this paper we 
demonstrate that the degree of product differentiation is a crucial factor to assess the welfare effects of a merger.
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Resumen
En este artículo usamos el modelo de diferenciación no-espacial de producto (Chamberliniano) para analizar los efectos 
benéficos en las adquisiciones empresariales horizontales con cantidad de competencia. Aquí argumentamos que (i) las 
adquisiciones empresariales pueden ser promovedoras del beneficio si el grado de diferenciación de productos aumenta 
después de la absorción; y, (ii) las adquisiciones privadas lucrativas también pueden  beneficiosas. Consecuentemente, este 
artículo demuestra que el grado de diferenciación de producto es un factor crucial para evaluar los efectos benéficos de una 
adquisición empresarial.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement 
when evaluating mergers in industries with differenti-
ated products. Broadly, the agencies consider two basic 
theories of competitive effects. “Coordinated effects” 
arise if the merger would make collusion between the 
merged firm and its rivals more likely, or make their 
behavior more accommodating. “Unilateral effects” 
arise if the merger would give the merged entity a uni-
lateral incentive to harm consumers1. This approach, 
however, does not always work well in the large class 
of mergers in which the merging firms sell differenti-
ated products and the agencies must weigh concerns 
about unilateral effects. Product differentiation can 
make defining the relevant market problematic, notably 
because products must be ruled “in” or “out”. In any 
case, there is a common perception that the degree of 
product differentiation is a crucial determinant of the 
welfare effects of horizontal mergers. 
Oligopoly theory in a collusive environment (Far-
rell & Shapiro, 1990; Deneckere & Davidson, 1985; 
Escrihuela-Villar, 2008) generally predicts that hori-
zontal mergers will lead to at least marginally higher 
prices if they generate no efficiencies when products 
are homogeneous. This approach, however, leaves out 
product differentiation. On the contrary, an extensive 
empirical literature has tried to explain the welfare ef-
fects of horizontal mergers with product differentiation. 
Generally, in a differentiated product context, mergers 
that raise prices still may enhance total welfare (see for 
instance Werden & Froeb, 1994; Ivaldi & Verboven, 
2005). A very good example is the merger proposed in 
2007 between Whole Foods and Wild Oats, two chains 
of grocery stores specializing in natural and organic 
food. Seeking to block the merger, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) argued that Whole Foods and Wild 
Oats competed in a market for “premium natural/organic 
supermarkets”. Later, the District Court stated: “[If] the 
relevant product market is, as the FTC alleges, a product 
1  See for instance the guidelines on the assessment of hori-
zontal mergers of the Official Journal of the European Union 
(2/5/2004).
market of premium natural and organic supermarkets 
consisting only of the two defendants and two other 
non-national firms, there can be little doubt that the 
acquisition of the second largest firm in the market by 
the largest firm in the market will tend to harm competi-
tion in that market. If, on the other hand, the defendants 
are merely differentiated firms operating within the 
larger relevant product market of supermarkets, the 
proposed merger will not tend to harm competition”. 
Hence, according to the Court interpretation, the degree 
of product differentiation is the crucial factor to assess 
the welfare effects of a horizontal merger.
The main purpose of this paper is thus to study to 
what extent the degree of product differentiation is a 
key factor in evaluating a horizontal merger. We address 
this issue by developing an oligopoly model with non-
spatial (Chamberlinian) product differentiation where 
firms compete in quantities. We show that any merger 
might be welfare enhancing if the degree of product 
differentiation increases after the merger. The intuition 
is that an increase in product differentiation reduces 
merger profitability, but increases total surplus in such 
a way that when products become more differentiated, 
the increase in welfare offsets the negative effects on 
surplus of the reduction in competition caused by the 
merger. 
We believe that the main interpretation of our result 
is that, without significant cost synergies, profitable 
mergers may also raise welfare whenever products 
are differentiated. Consequently, when assessing the 
welfare effects of horizontal mergers, besides the cost 
synergies, the firms’ possible effort to differentiate its 
products should also be taken into account. We also 
prove that in absence of cost synergies derived from 
the merger, a privately profitable merger involves 
a number of participants such that this merger only 
reduces welfare when the post-merger value of the 
product differentiation does not increase sufficiently. 
Then, it seems plausible to assume that, even without 
significant cost synergies, a proposed merger could 
be allowed by arguing that products are differentiated 
enough whenever the degree of differentiation between 
products increases sufficiently after the merger. The rest Escrihuela-Villar: On Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers with Product Differentiation 9 Vol. 16, Nº 30
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of the paper is structured as follows:  In section 2, we 
present the model and the welfare effects of mergers. 
We conclude in section 3. All proofs are grouped in 
the Appendix.
THE MODEL AND RESULTS
We consider an industry with N ≥ 2 firms indexed by           
i = 1,..., N. where firms compete in quantities producing 
non-spatial horizontally differentiated products such 
as that that the degree of differentiation between the 
products of any two firms is the same. We normalize 
marginal cost to zero. With an abuse of notation we 
have merged there will be N – M firms (and conse-
quently N – M products) in the market3. Let us denote 
the equilibrium profits obtained by firm i by ∏i (N, b). 
Then, a merger is considered to be (privately) profitable 
if the profits of merging firms increase after merger 
which implies that
∏i (N –M, b) – (M + 1) ∏i (N, b) > 0
From Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we know 
that with price competition, since reaction functions 
are typically upward sloping, mergers of any size are 
profitable4. On the contrary, mergers with quantity 
competition are (generally) not profitable (see Salant 
et al., 1983). Our model proves that with quantity 
competition mergers are less profitable when products 
are more differentiated.
Proposition 1: The number of firms required for a merger 
to be profitable decreases with b.
Intuitively, in absence of synergies derived from a merg-
er, a merger loses attractiveness as an anti-competitive 
device when products are more differentiated. In other 
words, Salant et al. (1983) demonstrate that the mini-
mum profitable merger, under Cournot oligopoly theory, 
involves at least 80 percent of the firms in the industry. 
Therefore, since the present model encompasses the 
  N    N   N 
Σ   Σ  Σ
  i = 1  2   i = 1  j ≠ 1
U(q) = 
     
qi – 1 (     qi
2 + 2b     qiqj).
denote by qi the quantity produced of good i by firm i, 
meaning that each firm produces a single differentiated 
product. Following Spence (1976 a, b) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), we consider that this industry has a rep-
resentative consumer with utility given by the function 
U(q), where q is the quantity vector and
Then, the demands for the differentiated products 
are derived from the solution to the program maxq 
U(q) – pq. For positive demands and i = 1, ..., N, the 
inverse demand function exhibits a Chamberlinian 
symmetry:
pi = 1 – qi – b    qj
where pi denotes the price of good i and qj the quan-
tity sold of good j.  It is assumed b > 0 where b can be 
interpreted as the parameter to measure the common 
degree of differentiation between any two products in 
the industry. Hence, b = 0 implies that the products are 
completely independent and b = 1 indicates that they 
are perfect substitutes. The value range for b implies 
that the products are viewed as substitutes rather than 
complements.
Consider the incentives of firms to merge2. In our 
setting, in absence of cost synergies, once M + 1 firms 
  N 
Σ
j ≠ 1
2   We do not consider here the process of endogenous merger 
formation. Its consideration probably requires a set-up in 
which the merger formation game is in a sequential fashion 
similar to Prokop’s (1999) sequential cartel formation pro-
cess. Otherwise, we would always have trivial Nash equilibria 
in which no firm would merge. This is an issue not raised 
here and left for future research. 
3   We avoid integer problems following the standard approach 
in the literature on oligopolistic interaction, which consists 
of treating the number of firms as a continuous variable.  We 
also note that, in our setting, a merger implies a reduction in 
the number of products. Conversely, and in a different set-
ting, Lommerud and S0rgard (1997) consider the number of 
brands as a choice variable. This is an issue not raised here 
and left for future research.
4   Note that for the value range for b assumed, with price com-
petition and product differentiation, reaction functions are 
also upward sloping.Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science 10  June 2011
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Cournot case if  b = 1, Proposition 1 shows that this 
minimum requirement is larger when b decreases. On the 
other hand, following Vives (1999) and since marginal 
costs of production are equal to cero, total surplus or 
welfare is given by U(q). Then, and in line with previ-
ous results (see Spence, 1976a, b and Lancaster, 1990, 
for a survey about the economics of product variety), 
it can be easily proved that total surplus increases with 
the degree of product differentiation. Consequently, 
there are two different forces at work when products 
become more differentiated. First, mergers reducing 
competition are less profitable, and second, welfare 
increases because consumers are better off when the 
degree of product differentiation increases. The point 
is whether there exists an increase in the degree of 
product differentiation such that welfare may increase. 
Therefore, considering a possible increase in the degree 
of product differentiation after the merger, the following 
result can be drawn:
Proposition 2: If M< b(8 + 3b(–1 + N)) (–1 + N)N 
there is always a post-merger degree of product differ-
entiation above the pre-merger one where all mergers 
are also welfare enhancing.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: 
obviously, mergers that do not reduce costs and only 
reduce competition also reduce welfare. However, 
if after the merger the degree of product differentia-
tion would increase, consumers’ welfare would also 
increase. In this case, although mergers tend to reduce 
welfare, if the number of merging firms is below a 
certain threshold, we can always find a post-merger 
degree of product differentiation such as that welfare 
also increases. As a consequence, an interesting in-
terpretation of the last result is that when evaluating 
mergers in industries with differentiated products, it 
should also be considered which the potential degree 
of product differentiation is after the merger, since this 
could be used as a plausible screen for likely welfare 
effects. The natural question arises if whether when 
mergers are privately profitable an increase in the 
degree of product differentiation can render mergers 
also welfare enhancing.
Proposition 3: A profitable merger can also be welfare 
enhancing when the increase in the degree of product 
differentiation is high enough.
For a merger to be profitable a minimum number of 
firms have to be involved in the merger. On the contrary, 
Proposition 2 states that only when the merger involves 
less than a certain number of firms, the merger can en-
hance welfare via an increase in the degree of product 
differentiation. Proposition 3 comes from the fact that 
the reduction in competition needed for the merger to 
be profitable is large enough for the merger to reduce 
welfare only when the post-merger degree of product 
differentiation is not large enough. In other words, 
whenever the differentiation between the products can 
be sufficiently increased, profitable mergers may also 
increase welfare.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have developed a theoretical framework to study the 
effect on welfare of mergers in a market with product 
differentiation, a problem that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, has not been extensively considered. We prove 
that the results by Salant et al. (1983) are sensitive to the 
assumption of homogeneous products. We show that the 
degree of product differentiation is a crucial determinant 
of profitability and welfare effects of mergers in such a 
way that, if the degree of product differentiation increases 
a merger, it may also be welfare enhancing. Interestingly, 
these results hold in the absence of synergies or fixed 
cost economies. On the other hand, when the merger 
is privately beneficial, welfare can also be increased 
when the post-merger degree of product differentiation 
increases sufficiently. Our results thus provide also the 
interpretation that the negative effects on welfare of 
the well-known merger paradox might vanish when we 
consider the degree of product differentiation.
The framework we have worked with is, admittedly, 
a particular one. To analyze real-world cases of merg-
ers, firms’ capacities, cost asymmetries or variable cost 
synergies should also be considered. We believe that 
those are subjects for future research.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Standard  calculations  show  that  the  profit  function  when  firms  compete  in  quantities  is  given  by                                                                                                             
∏i(N, b) = 
(2 + b (n –1))2
.  Then, from inequality 2, a merger of M + 1 firms is profitable if  
M > – 3  +  2  +  N –   8 + b (4N – 3)   ≡ M*. It can be verified that this condition is more easily satisfied when b
decreases since ∂M* =  2( –1 + 
 8 + b(4N – 3)
   < 0 because 
 8 + b(4N – 3)
  >  
– N –1
  which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 2. 
It is easy to check that the quantity sold by each firm is qi  = 2 + b (M –1). Consequently, we can calculate total
surplus or welfare (U(q)) from expression 2, which is given by W(n, b) ≡ 
2(2 + b(N – 1))2, since in a symmetric
equilibrium U(q) = Nqi – 
1 (Nqi + 2b(N(N –1))qi. Consequently, W(N, b) represents the pre-merger total surplus.
Then, what we want to prove is that there exists b’ ∈ (0,1) with b’ < b such as that after the merger if b diminishes,
welfare increases. In short, W(N, b) – W(N – M, b’) > 0. It is immediate to verify that W(N, b) – W(N – M, b’) = 0 if
b’ = 
2(3 +b(–1 + N))N (–1 –M + N)
Proof of Proposition 3.  
From the proof of Proposition 1, mergers are profitable if M ≥ M*, thus we only have to compare M’ and M*.
Since  ∂M*  <  0  and  ∂M’  =    4(4  +  b(–1  +  N))  (–1  +  N)N  >  0, t hen,  lim  M’b→0  =  0  and  lim  M*
b→0=  ∞. 
We only have to check that lim M’b→0 = N + 4 (–1 +     1          ) > lim M*
b→0= 
1
 + N – 5 + 4N  to see that when M’ ≥ M*
can be true. In this case, when the post-merger degree of product differentiation is below b’, a merger is both
profitable and welfare increases.
1









–M(2 + b(–1+N))2 + 2(–4N +       (M–N)(M(2+b(–1+N))2 – (4+b(–1+N))2 + b(–1+N)(b(–1+N)N +         (M–N)(M(2+b(–1+N))2  – (4+b(–1+N))2N))
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